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TAX THEORY AND "MERE CRITIQUE": A
REPLY TO PROFESSOR ZELENAK
NANCY C. STAUDT*
In Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously,' Professor Zelenak
outlines a number of problems with feminist and race theory
scholarship. His central criticism is that scholars writing in these
fields have failed to devise acceptable solutions to difficult policy
questions.2 Indeed, Zelenak goes so far as to claim that "[i]t is unfair
to criticize current law ... without showing a way to do better;...
mere critique without a workable solution does nothing to better
anyone's situation."' Scholars must focus on "solutions rather than
on complaints,"4 he argues, if they are to provide a balanced and
complete analysis of the issues at hand.
Zelenak's single-minded focus on solutions is both ironic and
bizarre. First, it is ironic because he critiques the policy proposals
contained in the literature, yet he fails to offer any workable
solutions of his own. If "mere critique" truly does not represent
valuable scholarship, then Zelenak's article is one of the most
problematic essays contained in this Symposium. At the same time,
Zelenak's difficulty with critical analysis is bizarre given that most
theorists would defend critical thinking as essential not only to tax
scholarship but to scholarship in virtually every discipline in the
academy.
* Visiting Scholar, Stanford Law School and Stanford Institute for Research on
Women and Gender; Associate Professor of Law, SUNY-Buffalo Law School. I thank
Mary Becker, Susan Cahn, Kornelia Freitag, Barry Friedman, Donna Harsch, and Kate
Silbaugh for their helpful comments in writing this essay.
1. Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1521
(1998).
2. See id. at 1524. Zelenak notes:
The most serious problem is the failure to think through proposed solutions with
sufficient care. The solutions are often presented as afterthoughts, with minimal
consideration of whether the author's goal is best achieved through the tax
system rather than through non-tax legal reform (a sort of "tax myopia"), and
with minimal consideration of whether the proposed tax solution will have the
desired effects.
Id. (footnote omitted).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1578.
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In this essay, I briefly explore the usefulness of critical
scholarship generally and then point to the manner in which this type
of analysis can (and does) advance Zelenak's aim of devising
technical solutions to difficult policy problems. I then turn to
Zelenak's critique of my article, Taxing Housework.5 I argue that far
from undermining my proposal to tax imputed income, Zelenak's
work highlights several reasons for considering the proposal as an
alternative to the existing tax structure. Importantly, I do not claim
that taxing women's household labor is a perfect solution to the
social and economic problems that women suffer. Rather, I hope
that this exchange is part of a larger debate that ultimately facilitates
a greater understanding of feminist issues in the context of federal
taxation.
I. CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND REASONED DEBATE
Critical analysis of the law (or a text of any kind) entails
identifying underlying assumptions and premises as well as offering a
careful judgment and a reasoned opinion about the subject matter at
hand. This type of analysis enables theorists to clarify the social and
economic realities of various legal arrangements; it situates
individuals and groups into a context that is often hidden from the
very agents who are most affected. Critical analysis, of course, often
does not lead to a neat, unified account of the truth or, for that
matter, an easily identifiable solution to the matters under
consideration. Indeed, the analysis often raises more controversy and
debate than it settles-it is widely understood that competent
analysts can and will disagree about fundamental matters.
Zelenak, however, is uninterested in a reasoned debate with
regard to the underlying premises and assumptions of the existing
legal order. Instead, he argues that critically analyzing the laws is a
pointless endeavor which does "nothing to better anyone's
situation."6 This unfortunate claim ignores the value of knowledge
and information as well as the advantages we obtain from heightened
consciousness and a deeper understanding of the world around us.
Not only does Zelenak fail to recognize the importance of
critical thinking on its own terms, but he also fails to understand its
importance for initiating the very legal reform that he argues is so
essential to rigorous tax scholarship. A critical analysis of the
existing legal arrangements must take place prior to developing the
5. Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996).
6. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1524.
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social policies that remedy the perceived problems with the law.
After all, without fully understanding the problem, analysts could not
hope to remedy it. Put differently, Zelenak's goal of devising
workable legal reform is unattainable without the preexisting critique
that so disturbs him. His argument for more solutions and less
criticism defeats itself.
Moreover, Zelenak's focus on policy initiatives leads him to
disregard a number of important insights in the work he criticizes.
Consider his criticism of my article Taxing Housework. Zelenak
argues that my proposal to tax imputed income, like all proposals in
the tax literature, "is supposed to be merely a means to an end."7 Yet
he points out that if my aim is to empower women, then my proposal
will not accomplish this end given the significant costs associated with
taxation. I readily concede that taxing housework raises a number of
difficult issues; Zelenak's exclusive focus on these problems,
however, causes him to miss the nuance of my argument. In the
article, I explore the paradox of Congress's decision to tax the profits
of domestic labor performed in the market while ignoring the value
of identical services performed for one's own family. I first note that
generations of tax scholars, including Zelenak,s have defended this
market/nonmarket distinction given the administrative difficulties of
measuring and valuing household labor, the potential economic
hardships of paying a tax on nonmarket labor, and the social dangers
associated with commodification.9 Upon a close inspection of each of
these objections, I suggest that they are based upon erroneous
assumptions and faulty logic.10 Without a persuasive rationale for the
nontaxation of housework, my article suggests that a dramatic and
controversial change in the tax laws is warranted-regardless of its
effect on women. This is no small claim given the universal
acceptance of the existing market/nonmarket binarism as applied to
housework.1 Moreover, this approach is not pragmatism as Zelenak
suggests (although it has practical feminist implications), but a
theoretical argument that easily fits within the traditional tax policy
debates concerning the proper scope of the tax base. 2
7. Id. at 1535.
8. See Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339,
404 (1994) (arguing that a tax on imputed income would seriously distort the Code).
9. See Staudt, supra note 5, at 1576-79 (discussing various policy problems
associated with taxing housework).
10. See id. at 1618-40.
11. See id. at 1577 n.23.
12. See, e.g., HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF
INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY (1938) (exploring the arguments for a
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Zelenak dismisses my interest in the tax base as mere fascination
with academic issues largely unrelated to the tax reform I propose.13
Yet my analysis regarding the illogical exclusion of women's
household labor from the tax base is key to the claims I make
throughout the article. Once it becomes clear that scholars and
policymakers have defended an incoherent tax structure, the obvious
question is why does the system continue to exist with such
widespread support? The answer, I argue, can be traced to the
popular and scholarly perception of women's nonmarket labor.
Rather than having economic value, housework is viewed as simply
the extension of the love and compassion that women have for their
families. 4 Housework, in other words, is more often identified with
nontaxable items such as leisure than it is with taxable items such as
the profits obtained through market labor. The refusal to
acknowledge the productive aspects of women's labor through
taxation, in turn, works to further marginalize women, economically,
politically, and socially. Thus, in exploring the costs of nontaxation, I
develop a contentious point: Taxation may actually afford significant
(yet unexplored) advantages to the taxpayer.
Zelenak does not address my claim that Congress's failure to tax
housework contributes to the marginalization of women; instead, he
simply insists that taxing housework is a flawed solution to the
problem I identify. 5 This claim, however, evades the difficult
question that I raise with regard to the impact of the current legal
structure upon women. At most, Zelenak suggests that I have not
found the "right answer" to a difficult policy problem (that is,
women's marginalization). He does not demonstrate that the
underlying problem does not exist, nor does he challenge my claim
that the tax structure seriously exacerbates this problem. If my
analysis convinces the legal world (or at least my readers) that the tax
laws are both incoherent and unfair to women, then society will be
one step closer to gender justice. Only a thorough understanding of
the existing inequities, after all, will allow us to devise laws that will
promote greater equality between men and women. In short, even if
my solution to this policy problem is inchoate or even entirely
comprehensive tax base). For a critique of Simons's work, see Nancy C. Staudt, The
Political Economy of Taxation: A Critical Review of a Classic, 30 L. & SOC'Y REV. 657,
654-55,662-64 (1996).
13. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1535.
14. For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon in the law generally, see
Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 1, 25-79 (1997).
15. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1527-42.
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impractical, 6 the analytical insights that lie beneath it should be of
value to any scholar or practitioner interested in legal reform.
II. ZELENAK ON HOUSEWORK
In addition to Zelenak's failure to understand the broader goals
and aims of critical theory, his detailed investigation of the policy
reform proposals he finds in the literature has serious drawbacks.
His work reflects a number of mischaracterizations and
inconsistencies as well as an incomplete analysis of many of the issues
he raises. Consider again his critique of my article Taxing
Housework. Zelenak identifies four potential problems for legal
reformers seeking to account for the value of housework: (1)
constitutional limitations may prevent sex-based legislation but not
sex-neutral legislation, thereby preventing Congress from taxing
women's housework; (2) various strands of feminist theory exist and,
thus, feminists will fail to reach a consensus on the proposal to tax
housework; (3) contrary to my argument, taxing housework will not
convey the view that the work has value; and (4) taxation will not
award economic benefits to women but will impose economic harm.
Because the first two points are rather obvious, I will comment only
briefly upon them and then turn quickly to points three and four.
Zelenak is, of course, correct when he states that given the
current constitutional doctrine, both Congress and the courts will
resist explicitly sex-based legislation.17 Zelenak errs, however, when
he claims that I "contemplate[] an explicitly sex-based tax and
benefits system" thereby raising serious constitutional problems. 8 In
fact, I never take a position on the issue. In writing Taxing
Housework, I intentionally declined to propose legislation or to
explore the specific details of any statute that would impose a tax on
housework for two reasons. First, the article was written to highlight
the problems with the current tax regime-both its general
incoherence and its harmful impact upon women. Rather than
hoping to convince Congress to adopt a specific housework tax, I
hoped to convince scholars and policymakers that the treatment of
16. I note in my article that Congress may very well choose not to tax housework-
even if the legislators are convinced that my underlying analysis is correct. See Staudt,
supra note 5, at 1579; see also Michael Livingston, Radical Scholars, Conservative Field:
Putting "Critical Scholarship" in Perspective, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1791, 1798 (1998) (correctly
interpreting the argument in Taxing Housework as an effort to raise consciousness rather
than to promote a particular legal reform).
17. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1540-42.
18. Id. at 1540.
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this income was driven more by the underlying assumptions about
the value of household labor than by logic. Second, I recognized that
the technical drafting issues would be of little substantive importance.
Regardless of how Congress drafted the legislation that imposed a
tax upon housework (that is, with sex-based or sex-neutral language),
the impact upon men and women would be very similar. As Anne
Alstott has pointed out, "[o]nce we recognize that women are more
likely than men to be primary caregivers," phrasing legislation in
gender-neutral language will not change the fact that it is women who
will largely be subject to the benefits and the burdens of taxation.19
Recognizing this fact himself, Zelenak ultimately disregards the so-
called constitutional problem and is left making the rather banal
statement that he does not "like" my proposal in either the sex-
neutral or sex-based form.20
Zelenak's second point-that feminists have not reached a
consensus on the proper legal treatment of women-is, of course, not
a new insight. Indeed, in the introduction to Taxing Housework, I
highlight various strands of feminist theory and then refer to them
throughout the article.2 ' What makes Zelenak's point surprising is
not that he echoes what countless theorists before him have pointed
out, but his solution to the difficulty of addressing divergent views
within the feminist literature. In his words: "All I suggest is that,
given the inevitable tradeoffs between different feminist goals,
feminists ... [must] moderate the rhetoric in their criticisms of
current law."'  Zelenak suggests further that feminist theorists
consider the possibility that Congress is "making a good faith effort
to address a feminist dilemma."' 3
Worried about the frustration that legislators must experience
when dealing with competing constituent interests, Zelenak, in effect,
suggests that feminist theorists be kinder and gentler in their critical
analysis of the laws. Given that Zelenak fails to point to any rhetoric
that he finds inappropriate or excessive,24 it is impossible to know
19. Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional
Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001,2046 (1996).
20. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1542.
21. See Staudt, supra note 5, at 1571-73. Zelenak may have missed this point given
that I describe the various feminist theoretical perspectives in language that does not
mirror his.
22. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1540.
23. Id.
24. Zelenak notes that I do not write at the "rhetorical level of some feminist tax
policy critics," but he does argue that I "offern] dubious characterizations of congressional
behavior," id. at 1540 n.97, and suggests the same about Edward McCaffery. He notes,
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what exactly he finds problematic-unless it is critical analysis itself.
Moreover, the absurdity of his proposal becomes all too apparent if
we imagine Zelenak making this same plea to the economists who
harshly criticize Congress for adopting inefficient and irrational tax
laws, despite the fact that the legislature cannot possibly satisfy the
various strands of contemporary economic theory in devising tax
legislation.
The third difficulty with Taxing Housework, according to
Zelenak, is the problem of symbolic politics. Zelenak agrees with my
conclusion that broadening the tax base to include the value of
women's household labor will have symbolic effects. The dispute
revolves around the question of what precisely taxation will
symbolize. Zelenak's own view on the issue is difficult to discern
given that he makes inconsistent claims. He first notes that because
individuals dislike paying taxes, a tax on imputed income will
symbolize a legislative "insult" to household workers, thereby
symbolizing a lack of respect for the work itself. 1 He later argues,
however, that taxing housework is a form of special legislation which
will signal "official validation" of the work that women do in the
home.2
6
Initially, it appears that neither of Zelenak's claims addresses my
argument that taxation will reinforce the idea that housework has
economic value and is not merely a gift of love or a leisurely activity.
Zelenak's first observation that few, if any, individuals enjoy paying
taxes (and thus are "insulted" when they must do so) does not lead to
the conclusion that taxpayers believe they have nothing of value.
Indeed, just the opposite is true. Most individuals seek to avoid
paying taxes not because they believe the government has affronted
their dignity, but because they hope to reserve the value of their
property for themselves. Zelenak's second claim suggests that by
taxing housework, Congress will sanction women's roles in the home
(and thus discourage them from working in the market)Y Even if
Zelenak is correct that taxation would promote a gendered division
of labor, his claim does not imply anything about the underlying
for example, that I argue Congress harms women in" 'refusing to count unpaid household
labor in the calculation of retirement benefits,'" id. (emphasis in original) (quoting
Staudt, supra note 5, at 1598-99), and that McCaffery "attributes 'the basic structure of
our laws' to 'a highly gendered patriarchic world,'" id. (quoting EDWARD J.
MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 1058 (1997)). Zelenak fails to explain why these
statements are "dubious" or why he finds them problematic.
25. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1528-29.
26. Id. at 1539.
27. See id. at 1539-40.
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economic value of housework itself. Put differently, a gendered
division of labor may promote gender stereotypes, but it suggests
very little about the economic value of the work being done.
Ironically, however, Zelenak's first claim strongly supports my
argument that taxation symbolizes economic value. Consider again
the burden ("insult") that taxpayers experience when the
government levies a tax upon them. Because only those individuals
who own valuable assets are subject to the burden, a tax on
housework will necessarily highlight the fact that the work has
economic value. Taxpayers may not enjoy paying the tax, but it
unambiguously will convey the view that housework has more in
common with market labor than with leisurely activities.
Zelenak would have been more successful in criticizing the
symbolic aspects of taxing housework if he had explored the flip side
of the above argument (the flip side being that Congress's refusal to
tax housework may actually convey the view that the work has
economic value). While it is clear that Congress taxes only
economically valuable items, it is far from clear that nontaxation
implies a lack of value. Consider, for example, the exclusion of a
taxpayer's economic gains on property obtained through market
appreciation, or the countless deductions, exclusions, and exemptions
offered to encourage various taxpayer activities. In many contexts
nontaxation symbolizes the economic importance of the work to
society. Indeed, economists have long argued that Congress should
continue to devise an incentive structure that awards tax benefits to
individuals engaged in activities deemed important for the growth
and stability of the national economy. Throughout Taxing
Housework, however, I argue that given the historical perception of
housework, it is unlikely that the exemption from taxation symbolizes
the value of the labor to the market economy.' My argument that
nontaxation symbolizes a devaluing of the work may have convinced
Zelenak, but it is equally likely that his single-minded focus on
solutions (and his easy dismissal of the underlying critical analysis)
causes him to miss the more vulnerable claims.
Zelenak's fourth and final point suggests that even if taxation
improves the popular perception of housework, it will not necessarily
afford women greater economic benefits. In writing Taxing
Housework, I devised three hypothetical taxpayers to demonstrate
the economic advantages of my proposal for women in various
28. See Staudt, supra note 5, at 1627.
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socioeconomic circumstances.29 In seeking to demonstrate the
disadvantages of my proposal, Zelenak compares the economic
position of these three hypothetical taxpayers under current law and
under my proposal. His technical analysis provides a useful tool for
understanding the issues that are often obscured in a more
theoretical analysis of the law. In this way, Zelenak's criticism adds
to my own analysis-indeed, this is the very value of a critical debate.
As I demonstrate below, however, Zelenak's technical work tends to
bolster rather than weaken my claims.
In the first hypothetical, Ellen (a married woman with two
children and a part-time job) will pay income and Social Security
taxes in the short term and will receive at least $730 per month in
retirement benefits for the work she performs as a mother. If Ellen
were subject to current law, her retirement benefits would be tied to
her marital status rather than to the actual labor she performs. Given
this difference in treatment, my proposal will ensure that Ellen gets a
greater level of benefits in all five of the following situations: she
stays married; she gets a divorce without having been married for ten
years; she gets a divorce after ten years of marriage and remains
single; she gets a divorce after ten years of marriage and remarries; or
she is widowed and remarries." The only situation in which Ellen
will be economically worse off under my plan than under current law
is if she is widowed and never remarries. As Zelenak puts it, a
homemaker in Ellen's position who "thinks the most likely outcome
is that she will be a widow for ten or twenty years,... will not want to
trade her right under current law ... [for the rights] under Staudt's
plan."131 Of course, the number of women who will gain under my
proposal will most likely far exceed the number who will lose.32
Indeed, it is unlikely that even the women who are better off under
the current law expect to remain single for "ten or twenty years,"
suggesting that all women in Ellen's position will gamble on my
proposal.
Because Zelenak's comparison clearly suggests that Ellen is
unlikely to prefer current law as far as retirement benefits are
29. See id. at 1645-47.
30. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1534-35 (discussing the current Social Security rules
and their impact upon the hypothetical taxpayer, Ellen).
31. Id. at 1535.
32. In any given year, the vast majority of Americans are married. See, e.g., BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1997 tbls.58, 60. And of those women who divorce, the majority remarry. See,
e.g., id. at tbl.151.
1998] 1589
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concerned, he turns to the taxes that the government must levy to
ensure a taxpayer's access to the benefits. Zelenak argues that many
individuals in Ellen's position will view the costs of taxation as
greater than the benefits and thus will prefer the current regime.
Yet this criticism is directed to the Social Security laws in general and
not to my proposal specifically. If the costs of Social Security exceed
the benefits that are paid out in retirement, then all taxpayers (not
just Ellen) will object. My proposal, however, is an attempt to ensure
that women are put into the system that policymakers have long
viewed as advantageous to market workers, not to question the
system itself.
Zelenak, of course, may be correct that rational individuals
would not choose to be in the current system, but he fails to put forth
an argument that Congress should immediately dismantle the Social
Security structure. Moreover, his own analysis suggests that he
would not take this position. Zelenak points out that if the tax on
housework were written in gender-based language, we could expect
men who perform household labor to challenge the system as
unconstitutionally denying them access to valuable state benefits? 4
33. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1535.
34. While many tax policy analysts argue that women will be encouraged to
participate in the wage labor market if Congress taxes household labor, Zelenak argues
just the opposite. See id. at 1539. In making his claim with regard to the behavioral
effects of taxing housework, Zelenak notes that the Social Security laws award decreasing
retirement benefits for each additional dollar paid into the system; the first dollars are
replaced at 90%, then 32%, then 15%. Thus, while the absolute level of the Social
Security burden remains the same regardless of the replacement percentage used,
workers receive a higher return on the first dollar paid into the system. Zelenak argues
that if women work in the home paying Social Security taxes and receiving benefits at the
replacement value of 90% and 32%, they may be discouraged from going into the market
given the fact that they will incur only a 15% return on every additional dollar
contributed. See id. While I do not take a position that women should undertake market
work, Zelenak seems to suggest that if my proposal discourages this work it is
problematic from a gender perspective. Zelenak's claim is unconvincing for a number of
reasons-I will name just a few.
First, he ignores the fact that a tax on housework may itself push women into the
market. Without a wage for the housework performed, many women will be unable to
pay the tax burden without working in the market. Indeed, many academics find the idea
of taxing imputed income problematic precisely because it will provide an incentive for
waged labor rather than a disincentive as Zelenak claims. See, e.g., Mark G. Kelman,
Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why
They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 838 (1979). Second,
even if we focus only upon the benefits associated with taxation (that is, the Social
Security benefits) as Zelenak does, it is clear that Zelenak's claim is far too simplistic.
Women who are already in the market may seek to avoid undertaking housework as a
means of avoiding any further taxation, rather than vice versa as Zelenak claims. In
short, the housework tax may discourage women from undertaking household labor
1590 [Vol. 76
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Suppose, however, that the costs and benefits were such that no
rational individual would want to participate in the Social Security
system. Market workers, unfortunately, cannot opt out of the system.
Household laborers, however, could oppose a policy reform that
pushes them into the existing tax structure that imposes a greater
level of burdens than benefits. Yet, as a strategic matter, it is not at
all clear that this is the best option for women to pursue. As I note
throughout Taxing Housework, remaining at the margins of the law
ensures that women remain at the margins of society generally.35 Put
differently, the short-term costs that women will incur may be worth
the long-term advantages they will gain. Moreover, should Congress
devise an alternative, and more economically rational, system for
ensuring retirement benefits in the future, it is more likely that
women will be included in the new system if their concerns have
already been identified and addressed.3 6
With regard to the second hypothetical taxpayer, Deborah (a
middle-income, single mother), Zelenak's comparison
unambiguously indicates she will gain a greater level of retirement
benefits under my proposal than under current law. In commenting
on this, Zelenak first notes that Deborah may not want to pay greater
taxes for the greater benefits she receives upon retirement. 37 Again,
while this argument suggests that Congress should dismantle the
Social Security laws, it does not defeat my argument that Congress
should subject both men and women to the same benefits and
burdens of the existing system.
Zelenak, however, goes on to argue that even if Deborah wanted
to be in the system, it is not clear as a matter of tax policy why
rather than market labor. Moreover, women who have high-income jobs may have an
incentive to provide a greater number of hours to the waged labor force despite the
decreasing level of benefits attached to each dollar paid into the Social Security system.
This incentive will come about because once the value of household labor and the market
wage are stacked on top of each other, the women may come close to $61,200-the point
at which a worker is no longer assessed a Social Security tax. At this point, the worker
will have a greater incentive to work because her marginal tax rate will decrease due to
the elimination of the Social Security tax on all income above $61,200. Finally, the tax on
housework may disrupt the gendered division of labor, leading men to do more
housework and women to do less. This phenomenon will also occur because of the
$61,200 cut-off point. The wage-earner who earns this level of income can undertake
household chores and at the same time avoid the Social Security tax. Because the higher-
earning spouse is often the male, the couple may allocate household labor to him. Freed
of these time-consuming chores, women may work in the market at greater levels.
35. See Staudt, supra note 5, at 1589-99.
36. See Kathleen Fieldstein, Social Security's Gender Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1998,
at A27.
37. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1536.
1998] 1591
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Congress should impose the housework tax upon her. He points out
that the existence of children does not reflect an increased ability to
pay taxes, nor does it suggest that women will have a greater need for
income in retirement. These claims are surprising for a number of
reasons.
With regard to the ability-to-pay issue, it is unclear whether
Zelenak makes this claim because he believes the work has no
economic value or because he believes the labor does not provide
cash income to the household. If it is the former, countless empirical
studies have proven otherwise.3 1 If it is the latter, then Zelenak, of
course, is correct that household labor does not afford women cash
income, but Zelenak must then explain why this fact necessarily
defeats the argument for taxation. In other contexts, Congress has
imposed a tax on valuable items (such as individual pension plans and
stock options) despite the fact that the items do not contribute to the
taxpayer's immediate cash flow. Zelenak, therefore, must do more
than simply raise the ability-to-pay problem; he must explain why it
settles the issue.
In addition to practical cash flow problems, the ability-to-pay
theory also implies a principle of tax fairness that requires Congress
to apportion tax burdens according to each individual's ability to pay.
Theorists and policymakers generally have used the theory to justify
the progressive income tax rate system. High-income individuals, it
is argued, have a greater ability to pay and thus should suffer a higher
marginal tax rate. Despite its prominence in the income tax policy
debates, the concept has not played a central role in the Social
Security context. Under the Social Security rules, for example,
individuals (at all income levels) must pay taxes at a rate of 7.65% on
income up to $61,200, and any income above this amount is exempt
from the tax entirely.4' In short, the Social Security laws impose a
regressive marginal tax rate-just the opposite of what the ability-to-
pay norm would mandate. While tax programs, such as the Earned
Income Tax Credit ("EITC") program, may offset some of the Social
Security costs for low-income individuals, these programs are entirely
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., EUSTON QuAH, ECONOMICS AND HoME PRODUCrION 79-101 (1993)
(citing studies that estimate the value of women's household labor to the market
economy).
40. Employers and employees must pay Social Security and Medicare hospital
insurance taxes (collectively know as FICA) at a rate of 7.64%. The Social Security tax is
6.2% of gross wages up to $61,200 of the employees' wages. See I.R.C. §§ 3101(a),
3111(a) (1994). An additional Medicare tax of 1.45%, again payable by both the
employer and employee, is imposed on all wages. See id. §§ 3101(b), 3111(b).
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independent of the Social Security laws. Indeed, many theorists have
argued that the EITC should be dismantled despite the fact that such
a repeal would leave low-income individuals with a significant tax
burden under the mandatory retirement system that currently exists.
Zelenak's second claim with regard to the hypothetical taxpayer
Deborah (that is, the claim that the existence of children does not
mean women have a greater need for retirement income) is
contradicted by a number of empirical studies. These studies suggest
that women are likely to live in poverty precisely because children
impinge upon their ability to earn and to save for retirement.4'
Compared to the male breadwinner, women are far more likely to
live in poverty in old age.42 Zelenak's claim that children have no
impact upon women's economic need not only is inaccurate, but it
may also be of little relevance to the issue at hand. Just as Congress
has ignored the ability-to-pay theory in devising the Social Security
laws, it has disregarded economic need in allocating the tax burden.
Although early legislators' concern for elderly individuals living in
poverty led to the adoption of the Social Security laws in the first
place, this concern did not define the scope of the laws. All workers,
regardless of their potential income in retirement, must pay the tax
while working in the waged labor force. Indeed, failure to do so
could lead to the imposition of significant federal penalties.43
Unless Zelenak is prepared to challenge the operation of the
Social Security laws, his point that Deborah does not have a greater
ability to pay or greater economic need in retirement is something of
a non sequitur to my argument that Deborah should be included in
the system as it is currently set up. My argument rests primarily on
the claim that Deborah has performed the type of labor that should
41. See Staudt, supra note 5, at 1596-99 & nn.104-12. The underlying reason for this
decreased earning capacity is apparent: children reduce the caretaker's ability to earn a
salary on the market. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE
FAMILY 149-56 (1989) (discussing housework and the cycle of vulnerability). Women
who maintain low-paying and part-time jobs, in turn, are unable to amass retirement
savings. As Richard Burkhauser and Karen Holden have pointed out, high wages and
high levels of market participation correspond to greater Social Security benefits. See
RICHARD V. BURKHAUSER & KAREN C. HOLDEN, A CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL
SECURITY: THE CHANGING ROLES OF WOMEN AND MEN IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 1-4
(1982).
42. See Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security,
and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 264,
277 (1989); Fieldstein, supra note 36, at A27.
43. See, e.g., Joseph Radtke, S.C. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 143, 146 (E.D. Wis.
1989), affd, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that Social Security taxation cannot be
avoided through complicated avoidance schemes).
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subject her to the burdens and the benefits of the existing legal
structure. Although Zelenak may be correct that Congress should
reform the system to impose Social Security taxation upon only the
relatively wealthy (those with the ability to pay) and award benefits
only to those in need, these proposals do not undermine my claims in
Taxing Housework.
Finally, Zelenak considers the third hypothetical taxpayer,
Martha (an unemployed, single mother), who will be entitled to
$6240 annually upon retirement under my proposed plan. Zelenak
pursues an unusual strategy in attacking my argument for providing
Martha retirement benefits that are tied to her household labor. He
first suggests that a taxpayer in Martha's position (unemployed and
single) may not need the assistance that my proposal offers-the
current law may be sufficient. This suggestion is surprising given the
overwhelming evidence indicating that women who are poor during
their working years are likely to live in poverty in old age.'
Nevertheless, to support his claim, Zelenak notes that the Social
Security laws mandate that the five lowest earning years be dropped
from the calculation of one's retirement benefits. Thus, Zelenak
notes, Martha could be a nonworking single mother for five years and
not suffer a reduction in her retirement benefits under current law.
Here again, Zelenak forgets that Social Security taxes are
imposed not only upon those in need, but on any individual who has
performed the requisite labor. Because Martha will have performed
household labor for at least eighteen years (regardless of whether she
is in or out of the market), she should be entitled to the benefits of
the labor regardless of how she prospers in retirement under current
law. Moreover, Zelenak ignores the reality of a single mother's life
when he suggests that Martha could easily go into the workforce five
years after having children. Given the difficulty and expense of hiring
childcare, many single mothers are forced either to stay out of the
workforce or to work part-time jobs for a significant period of time.
Accordingly, even if the five lowest earning years are dropped, many
women will be unable to obtain the level of retirement benefits that
ensures economic security in old age.
Zelenak goes on to argue that even if my proposal ensures that
women have access to much-needed Social Security benefits, I have
not proven that my proposal ensures economic security in old age for
taxpayers in Martha's position. Although countless theorists have
debated the level of income necessary to ensure access to basic
44. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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human needs, the claim that an annual income of $6240 is negligible
to an elderly individual with no income is disingenuous. This level of
transfer may not lift her out of poverty but would come close-and it
would be significantly better than receiving nothing at all.45
Ill. CONCLUSION
Many theorists and commentators have noted that the existing
tax structure works to the disadvantage of women in a variety of
ways.46 Given the importance of these issues to society in general and
to women in particular, I wrote Taxing Housework in an effort to
challenge the traditional thinking that has contributed to women's
marginalization in the first place. At the same time, I sought to
facilitate debate and deliberation on difficult social issues. While I
certainly do not know whether taxing women's household labor is the
only "right answer," or possibly even the "best answer," to the
problems that I identify in my article, it is clear that my proposal to
tax imputed income has sparked a productive and useful debate
among tax scholars.
45. The poverty line designated by the U.S. Census Bureau varies according to family
size and composition. In 1995, the federal government considered a married couple with
income equal to or over $12,590 and a single person earning $7470 to be outside the
boundaries of poverty. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Annual Update of the
HHS Poverty Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 7772 (1995).
46. For the most thorough discussion of these issues, see MCCAFFERY, supra note 24.
For a review of McCaffery's book, see Nancy C. Staudt, The Theory and Practice of
Taxing Difference, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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